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Vietnam is undertaking health financing reform in an attempt to achieve universal 
health insurance coverage by 2014. Changes in health insurance policies have doubled 
the overall coverage between 2004 and 2006. However, close examination of Vietnam 
Living Standard Surveys during this period reveals that about one fifth of the insured 
in 2004 dropped out of the health insurance system by 2006. This paper uses 
longitudinal data from VHLSS 2004 and 2006 to investigate the characteristics of 
those who joined and those who left the health insurance system. We model the static 
and dynamic health insurance choices allowing for heterogeneity of choices. The 
results from both static and dynamic models highlight the importance of income and 
education in determining the movement in or out of a particular scheme. The results 
from the static models of health insurance determinants show significant adverse 
selection in the current health insurance system where individuals with bad health are 
more likely to be insured. The findings from the dynamic models of health insurance 
ownership also suggest that the current health insurance system entails significant 
adverse selection where people with worse health are more likely to join or stay in and 
less likely to move out of the system. Some policy implications to increase coverage 
and to maintain financial sustainability of the health insurance system are drawn.  
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1  Introduction 
Vietnam is undertaking health financing reform in an attempt to achieve universal health 
insurance by 2014. Over the last five years, significant changes in health insurance policies 
have been implemented and have resulted in a rapid growth in coverage. In the two years 
from  2004  to  2006,  the  number  of  the  insured  doubled  (World  Bank  2007).  This 
impressive figure, while highlighting the success of the government’s measures to increase 
coverage during this period, disguises a striking fact that at the same time, about one fifth 
of those insured in 2004 dropped out of the health insurance system by 2006. The high 
dropout rate indicates that those policies, while successfully increasing the flow of the 
newly insured, fail to retain the stock of the insured in the system. In order to achieve 
universal  health  insurance  coverage,  Vietnam  needs  to  increase  the  number  of  newly 
enrolled  as  well  as  keep  those  currently  enrolled.  An  understanding  of  the  factors 
influencing  the  demand  for  health  insurance  is  clearly  necessary  and  is  thus  the  main 
purpose of this paper. 
Understanding  these  determinants  also  has  other  important  policy  implications  since 
currently Vietnam seems to be in a dilemma when it wants to increase the health insurance 
coverage and to sustain the financial sustainability of the health insurance fund at that same 
time.  The  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  people  who  enrolled  from  2004  to  2006 
coinciding  with  a  deficit
3  for  the first  time  in  the  health  insurance  fund  in  late  2006, 
suggest  there  might  be  a  tradeoff  between  an  increase  in  coverage  and  the  financial 
sustainability of the system. This deficit in the health insurance fund also indicates that 
adverse selection, a situation where people with worse health are more likely to purchase 
                                                
3  The  health  insurance  fund  switched  from  a  surplus  of  1989  billion  VND  in  June  2006,  which  was 
accumulated over the last ten years, to a deficit of 1200 billion VND at the end of 2006. In 2007, the health 
insurance fund also experienced a deficit of 1,650 billion VND. In 2008, deficit was at 1700 billion VND. In 
2009, the deficit was estimated at 2000 billion VND.   2 
health insurance, may exist in the health insurance system. Ironically, at the beginning of 
2008, in an attempt to increase coverage, the group-base requirements
4 which had been set 
up to reduce adverse selection were removed. In this context, a study of the motivations 
behind the movement in and out of the health insurance system could give insights into 
what Vietnam  should do to increase  coverage on  the  one hand and maintain financial 
sustainability of the health insurance system on the other. The experience of Vietnam then 
can  be  shared  with  other  developing  countries
5  which  are  pursuing  universal  health 
insurance coverage. 
This paper uses data from two recent waves of the Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Survey  (VHLSS)  in  2004  and  2006  to  explore  factors  influencing  individual  choices 
among various health insurance schemes. We first examine factors determining people’s 
current choices of health insurance. Then we examine factors influencing their subsequent 
choices of health insurance.  
Compared with other studies on health insurance determinants in Vietnam (for example, 
Trivedi 2004 or Wagstaff 2010), this paper is different in two respects. First, by using the 
multinomial  logit  model,  this  paper  is  the  first  to  examine  the  health  insurance 
determinants while allowing for heterogeneity of choices. Second, by investigating factors 
determining the movement in and out of the health insurance system, this paper makes 
another contribution to the literature as the first to study health insurance dynamics in 
Vietnam.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews Vietnam’s health insurance system. 
Section 3 describes the data set and discusses the transition of health insurance ownership 
                                                
4  Group  base  requirements  require  individual  to  enroll  in  the  voluntary  health  insurance  scheme  on  a 
household or community basis. See section 2 for details. 
5  For  example,  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia  aim  to  achieve  universal  coverage  by  2010  and  2014, 
respectively.    3 
in  Vietnam  during  the  2004  –  06  period.  The  empirical  model  and  econometric 
methodology  used  to  investigate  health  insurance  determinants  and  dynamics  are 
introduced  in  Section  4.  Empirical  results  on  determinants  and  dynamics  of  health 
insurance ownership are discussed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, Section 7 
summarizes and discusses the policy implications.  
2  The development of Vietnam’s health insurance system 
Vietnam’s formal health insurance system began in 1993. In general, Vietnam’s health 
insurance can be classified into three main schemes: compulsory health insurance (CHI), 
health care for the poor (HCFP) and voluntary health insurance (VHI).
6 Table 1 provides a 
summary of the Vietnamese health insurance system by scheme. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The compulsory part of the health insurance system consists of two separate schemes: 
social health insurance (SHI) and free health care for children below six years of age. The 
SHI scheme which was initiated in 1993 mainly covers public servants, employees in State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and those in the private formal sector. Initially, only private 
enterprises with ten or more workers were required to participate, but this size limit was 
dropped in 2005. The contribution to the scheme is set at 3 per cent of salary, of which the 
employer contributes 2 per cent and 1 per cent is paid by the employee.
7 The SHI covers 
also pensioners, the disabled and meritorious people (such as mothers, widows or orphans 
of veterans). The contribution of these groups is 3 per cent of pensions for pensioners or 3 
per  cent  of  the  minimum  wage  for  the  disabled  or  meritorious  people.  In  2005,  the 
                                                
TP
6
PT For other reviews of Vietnam health insurance, see Ekman at el. (2008) or World Bank (2007) (Lieberman 
and Wagstaff 2009). 
7 The 2008 Health Insurance Law increases the contribution rate to 6 per cent of salary, in which employees 
will pay 2 per cent of their salaries and employers 4 per cent. This law also increases the waiting time for 
VHI to be in effect for new enrollees to 180 days. In addition, health insurance will be compulsory for 
students from 2010.   4 
government decided that children under age six would be provided free health care at 
public health facilities. This program is financed by the central government budget. 
The second component of the health insurance system is the HCFP program which was 
established  in  2003  to  provide  free  health  care  access  to  individuals  in  households 
classified  as  poor;  households  in  especially  disadvantaged  communes;  and  ethnic 
minorities living in six mountainous northeast and five highland provinces. This HCFP 
program replaced another program, which provided a special health care card for the poor,
8 
a  program  that  had  little  success  mostly  due  to  funding  shortage  and  implementation 
difficulties (Ekman et al. 2008; Wagstaff 2007). Initially, provinces were free to decide 
whether to use the HCFP funding to purchase health insurance cards or to manage the risk 
themselves and provide direct reimbursement to providers. But in 2005, provinces were 
instructed to use HCFP resources to purchase health insurance cards directly for eligible 
people. This change thus allows HCFP beneficiaries to enjoy the same benefit package as 
those covered by CHI. 
The voluntary part of the health insurance system was initiated in 1993 to cover the rest of 
the population not covered by the CHI and HCFP. The implementation of VHI, however, 
was not actually carried out until 1995 and has been mainly applied to school students. 
VHI could not be spread over the non-student population due to lack of guidance policies 
as well as unattractive benefits. The benefit package is brought compatible between the 
VHI and CHI in 2003 and this marks a key step in increasing the VHI coverage over 
                                                
8 This program was set up via the circular 05/1999/TTLT-BYT-BLDTB&XH on health care policies for the 
poor. According to this grogram, local governments were reliant on their own budgets to finance the scheme. 
Due to the financial shortage of provincial governments, the coverage of the scheme was narrow and shallow. 
In addition, complicated application process and the restriction of one care provider per province are also 
reasons for the failure of this scheme (see Wagstaff (2007) for detail). In contrast to the previous program, 
the HCFP represents a substantial increase in financial resources allocated for the poor. The major part (75 
per cent) of the costs for the HCFP program is funded by the central government.   5 
school students.
9 However, membership requirements for non-student VHI had not been 
clearly stated until 2005 and were largely group based.
10 In particular, individuals who 
belong to households with all members participating in some form of health insurance and 
living in a commune with at least 10 per cent of households participating in VHI can join 
the scheme. In addition, students can join the VHI scheme as long as the institute they are 
studying  in  has  at  least  10  per  cent  of  students  participating.  These  group-based 
participation requirements were dropped in January 2008. The premium rates for VHI are 
set  according  to  ability  to  pay,  ranging  between  VND  40,000  (US$  2.5  per  year)  for 
students in rural areas to VND 160 (US$ 10 per year) for household members in urban 
areas.  
The benefit package is quite generous and includes outpatient and inpatient treatment at all 
levels of the health care system. Since 2003, the benefit package has been almost uniform 
across all schemes with some exceptions. For example, those insured under the pension or 
merit basis are entitled to 100 per cent of expensive high-tech treatment without limit while 
others have to pay the amount over a certain limit. In addition, the VHI card requires a 
waiting period to be put into effect. It can be used 30 days after the day the premium is 
paid for first time participants. In contrast, CHI scheme takes effect immediately. 
Regulations on co-payment for all types of health insurance change from time to time. 
From 2003 to September 2005, 20 per cent co-payment rate for treatment was shared by 
the insured. The benefits for the insured were more generous from September 2005 to 
April 2007 as all expenditures under VND 7 million (US$ 438) per treatment were covered 
by the insurer. For treatment above VND 7 million, 40 per cent co-payment is required for 
                                                
9 This is done via the inter-ministry circular 77/2003/TTLT-BTC-BYT dated 07/08/2003. 
10  These  group  base  requirements are  from  the  inter-ministry  circular number  22/2005/TTLT-BYT-BTC 
dated 24/08/2005.   6 
the  insured.  The co-payment  requirement  was  reintroduced  in  2007  where  the  insured 
under VHI scheme has to pay 20 per cent of costs incurred during treatment.  
Figure 1 shows the resultant impact of health insurance policies on coverage from 1993 to 
2006. From Figure 1, CHI appears to be the most utilized health insurance scheme in 
Vietnam and its coverage increased steadily over the period. The number of individuals 
insured  under  the  student  voluntary  scheme,  while  increasing  over  the  whole  period, 
declined from 1998 to 2000. This decline in coverage was attributed to increases in the 
premiums of the student voluntary scheme during these years (World Bank 2001). The 
coverage under the non-student voluntary scheme also experienced a decade of sluggish 
growth before it picked up significantly in 2005. The number of insured under HCFP has 
been increasing since its establishment in 1999. In 2006, the number of insured under 
HCFP  outweighed  that  under  CHI,  thus  becoming  the  largest  scheme.  For  the  health 
insurance system as a whole, although the percentage of the population insured declined 
temporarily in 1999, it increased substantially (eightfold) in the entire 1993 – 2006 period. 
In response to the dramatic changes in health insurance policies in 2003 and 2005, the 
proportion of the population covered almost doubled (from 22 per cent in 2004 to 43 per 
cent  in  2006,  an  increase  equivalent  to  the  accumulated  growth  in  coverage  over  the 
previous decade). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
3  Review of literature on demand for health insurance in Vietnam 
Some studies  briefly discuss the determinants of  health insurance status.  For  example, 
using data from the Vietnam Living Standard Survey in 1997/98, Trivedi (2004) cannot 
differentiate between voluntary and compulsory schemes and uses only one indicator for 
health insurance status in his study. Due to this aggregation of the two types of health   7 
insurance, his results on the positive correlation between age, education and income and 
insurance ownership are less informative. Furthermore, the timeframe when this study was 
carried  out  is  not  relevant  for  current  policy  debate  since  Vietnam’s  health  insurance 
system has undergone dramatic changes since 1997/98. More recently, Wagstaff (2007) 
uses data from Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) 2004 to study the 
impact of HCFP on health care utilization. In his paper, a Probit model is used to assess the 
determinants of being covered by HCFP. His main finding is that individuals living in a 
household with an elderly or illiterate head are more likely to be covered by HCFP. In 
addition, as designed by the scheme, living in a household that is categorized as poor or 
headed  by  an  ethnic  minority  individual  or  located  in  economically  disadvantageous 
regions significantly increases the probability of being covered by HCFP. Again, since the 
focus of Wagstaff’s (2007) study is on the impact of HCFP on health care utilization, no 
attention is given to other schemes. Similar to the study of Wagstaff’s (2007), a recent 
study of Axelson et al. (2009) on the impact of HCFP on health care utilization does not 
focus  on  other  schemes.  Using  Health  Survey  data  for  2002,  ADB  (2008)  finds  that 
demand for student voluntary insurance is positively associated with household income, 
education levels of the household head and accessibility of provincial hospitals. However, 
it  does  not  find  evidence  of  adverse  selection  in  student  voluntary  scheme.  To  our 
knowledge, there has been no study on the determinants of non-student voluntary health 
insurance and health insurance dynamics in Vietnam.  
Our primary focus is on the determinants of movement in and out of the voluntary scheme.  
This is of interest since people join on a voluntary basis so their choices partially reflect 
their  preferences  and  constraints.  In  addition,  although  several  policies  have  been 
implemented  to  minimize  adverse  selection  in  voluntary  schemes,  such  as  making  the 
participation unit the community or household rather than the individual and imposing a   8 
waiting time before obtaining benefits from the insurance scheme after participation, the 
effects of these methods have not been assessed empirically.  
Although it is argued that in a health insurance system where the majority of members are 
insured  on  a  non-voluntary  basis,  it  may  not  be  particularly  enlightening  to  study  the 
determinants  of  participation  in  such  schemes  as  SHI  and  HCFP  (World  Bank  2007). 
Determinants of the participation in these non-voluntary schemes are of interest in our 
study for two reasons.  
First, the current health insurance system is facing non-compliance and targeting problems. 
Although by law, employers are required to pay compulsory health insurance for their 
employees, the compliance rate is not high. In a recent report, the World Bank (2007) 
shows that by 2005, while almost all public employers participated in the CHI program, 
only about 40 per cent of private enterprises did. It also  claims that  due to a lack  of 
knowledge about insurance from both employees and employers, the issuance of health 
insurance cards depends on the awareness of employees about their rights, given their 
concerns  about  health  care  needs  and  their  bargaining  power  in  relation  with  their 
employers  (World  Bank  2007).  In  the  case  of  HCFP,  although  the  three  official 
determinants of HCFP coverage are clearly laid down (see Section 2), the targeting of the 
program  is  in  question  (Wagstaff  2007).  Furthermore,  there  is  anecdotal  evidence  of 
adverse selection created by local authorities who misused the HCFP funds by providing 
health insurance cards to the poor only when they needed medical treatment (World Bank 
2007).  Thus  by  studying  who,  among  the  eligible,  is  more  likely  to  receive  health 
insurance, this study provides evidence of the possible coverage or leakage of the program.  
Second and more importantly, in a health insurance system where individuals have several 
channels available to them to be covered, the probability of enrollment in one scheme   9 
depends on that in other schemes. For example, a poor person who is eligible for HCFP 
benefit is less likely to join the voluntary scheme. Studies that examine participation in one 
scheme in isolation from the others (for example, ADB (2008) or Wagstaff (2010)) do not 
reflect  the  interrelation  among  alternatives.  This  paper  uses  the  MNL  model  for  this 
purpose since it supports the interdependence amongst all options. 
4  Data 
4.1  Data 
We use data from the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) in 2004 and 
2006.
11 These surveys are conducted by Vietnam’s General Statistics Office, with technical 
support from the United Nations for Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank. 
The 2004 and 2006 VHLSS are nationally representative surveys covering 9,300 and 9,189 
households  in  2004  and  2006,  respectively.  Both  surveys  contain  information  on 
demographics,  education,  health,  employment  (on  an  individual  level),  income,  assets, 
expenditure (on the household level) and a range of community-level infrastructural and 
institutional variables. In particular, the VHLSSs contain valuable information on types of 
health insurance for each household member. The VHLSSs are particularly useful as they 
follow a panel of 4,200 households surveyed in both 2004 and 2006. This feature, together 
with  information  on  health  insurance  status,  allows  us  to  track  the  health  insurance 
ownership  dynamics  for  each  individual  through  a  period  of  many  changes  in  health 
insurance policies, thereby eliminating unobserved differences between individuals that 
remain unchanged over the period. 
                                                
11 Although another earlier version of VHLSS that was carried in 2002 can be used to create a panel for the 
period 2002 - 2006,  this  version does  not  have  information  on  health  insurance  on an individual  level. 
Therefore, we only use VHLSS 04 and 06 for this study. 
   10 
4.2  Sample 
We use different samples to investigate health insurance determinants and health insurance 
dynamics. In particular, all individuals aged seven or above, regardless of whether they 
were interviewed in both years, are included in the model of health insurance determinants.  
We exclude children aged under seven in 2006 from the 2006 sample because they should 
have had health insurance in 2006.
12 For comparability between the two surveys, we also 
exclude children aged six or under from the sample for VHLSS04. Finally, we have a 
sample  consisting  of  36,749  observations  at  the  individual  level  for  2004  and  35,626 
observations for 2006 to study the health insurance determinants. 
For the model of health insurance dynamics, we use a balanced panel of individuals who 
appear in both surveys. We restrict the panel sample to individuals whose age in 2006 was 
seven or more. With these restrictions, we have a sample of 15,504 individuals for each 
year (in 4,166 repeated households).
13 
4.3  Descriptive analysis of health insurance dynamics, 2004 - 06 
Table 2 describes the health insurance status of all individuals in the panel sample. Table 2 
shows  that  more  than  half  (50.4  per  cent),  an  increase  from  39  per  cent  in  2004,  of 
Vietnamese were covered by at least one type of health insurance in 2006.
14 In both years, 
                                                
12 However, our data show that 16 per cent of children aged under seven do not have any kind of health 
insurance in 2006. According to the Decree 36/2005/ND-CP, they can still receive health services for free at 
public facilities on the condition that they present “equivalent papers” such as birth certificates (World Bank 
2007) 
13  Among  4,200  household  repeated,  some  households  have  all  new  members.  These  households  are 
excluded from our sample. In addition, the original data provided by the GSO have some data entry errors for 
household and individual identification codes. These data entry errors make a large number of individual 
matches inconsistent (we use individual demographic data to identify possible inconsistency). We drop these 
households and individuals from our individual panel. Therefore, only 4,166 households are used for our 
analysis. 
14 Our calculation using VHLSSs shows a higher proportion of the population covered than that reported by 
VSS (as shown in Figure 1). Note that the statistics reported in Table 1 are calculated for the individual panel 
sample. If we use the sample of all individuals surveyed in 2004 and 2006 instead, we have almost the same 
proportion of the population covered as reported in Table 2. This figure does not change much when we use 
sampling weights either. Therefore, the number of the insured may be over-represented in the VHLSS 2004 
and 2006.   11 
three  main  types  of  health  insurance  were  HCFP,  student  voluntary  and  compulsory 
schemes.  Over  the  2004  -  06  period,  the  number  of  people  participating  in  HCFP, 
compulsory and non-student voluntary health insurance schemes increased while that for 
the student voluntary scheme was stable. Among those schemes that experienced growth in 
coverage, the non-student voluntary scheme showed the highest rise and tripled (from a 
low base of 1.4 per cent of the population who were covered under this scheme in 2004 to 
4.9 per cent in 2006).  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 also shows the transition in Vietnamese health insurance status from 2004 to 2006. 
For Vietnam as a whole, about 42 per cent of the panel individuals were uninsured in 2004 
and remained uninsured in 2006. 18.7 per cent of the panel individuals did not have any 
type of health insurance in 2004 but managed to have one by 2006. The health insurance 
enrollment rate was the highest for HCFP (7.3 per cent of the panel individuals or 12 per 
cent of the uninsured in 2004), following the student (4.7 per cent of the panel individuals 
or  8  per  cent  of  the  uninsured  in  2004)  and  other  voluntary  (4  per  cent  of  the  panel 
individuals or 7 per cent of the uninsured in 2004) schemes. Despite Vietnam’s efforts to 
increase health insurance coverage between 2004 and 2006, the proportion of individuals 
who moved in the other direction (insured in 2004 but uninsured in 2006) was fairly large; 
about 7.4 per cent of the panel individuals (or 19 per cent of the insured in 2004) dropped 
out of the health insurance system during the period. The drop out rate was highest for 
those insured under the student scheme (23 per cent of the insured under this scheme in 
2004), then HCFP (21 per cent) and non-student voluntary (19 per cent). Finally, 31.7 per 
cent of the panel individuals were insured in 2004 and remained so in 2006. Among the 
individuals who were insured in both years most remained in their original schemes. Those   12 
insured under the non-student voluntary scheme in 2004 was an exception where 37 per 
cent of them moved to CHI by 2006 and 17 per cent moved to HCFP scheme. 
5  Econometric Model 
We use the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model to analyze individual insurance choices and 
the dynamics of health insurance status. The MNL model states that the probability that an 
individual i is in state  j  is given by: 
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principle, there is one set of  s ' b for each state  j . However, to identify  J  sets of  s ' b , one 
of them must be set at an arbitrary value. For our purposes, we set the state  1 = j as the 
base group. All other sets of   s ' b  are estimated in comparison with this base group. 
For ease of interpretation, we calculate and represent the results in terms of the impact of 
the  variable  on  the  relative  risk  ratio  (RRR).  The  RRR  is  the  probability  of  a  given 
outcome divided by the probability of the base outcome  ) / ( ( 1 i ij P P Ln . Therefore, RRR of a 
coefficient indicates how the probability of the outcome falling in the comparison group 
compared to the probability of the outcome falling in the base group would change with 
the variable in question.  For  example, Table 3 shows MNL results of determinants  of 
health insurance ownership with being uninsured set as the base outcome. Suppose that an   13 
individual has a 20 per cent chance of being uninsured in some year (the base group) and 
40 per cent chance of being insured under HCFP. For that individual, the RRR of being 
insured under HCFP (relative to being uninsured) is 2 (0.4 divided by 0.2). The impact of 
each variable on the RRRs for ‘being insured’ under different schemes are also presented 
in Table 3. For instance, an individual with characteristic  x  ) 1 ( = x  has an RRR of being 
insured under HCFP of 40 per cent while an identical individual without that characteristic 
) 0 ( = x  has an RRR of being insured under HCFP of 20 per cent. The impact of this 
variable on the RRR is 2 (0.4 divided by 0.2) which means that it increases the relative 
probability of being insured under HCFP (relative to the probability of being uninsured) by 
100 per cent. A simple rule for the impact of a variable on the RRR is that an impact of 
greater than one (RRR>1) indicates that the variable increases the relative probability of 
being in the comparison group while an impact of less than one (RRR <1) indicates that the 
variable reduces the relative probability of being in the comparison group. 
Other  econometric  issues  involve  sampling  weights  and  clustering.  First,  since  both 
VHLSS04  and  06  were  over-sampled  in  certain  areas,  we  use  sampling  weights  to 
calculate  representative  statistics  (O'Donnell  et  al.  2008).  We  use  the  corresponding 
weights for the model of health insurance determinants for each year. For the individual 
panel data used in the model of health insurance dynamics, we use the weight in 2004 as 
the  benchmark.
15  Second,  both  VHLSS04  and  06  use  a  three  stage  stratified  cluster 
sampling  method  with  commune  as  the  primary  sampling  unit.  Clustering  raises  the 
possibility of intra-commune correlation and results in the smaller estimated variance of 
the coefficients. In this study, to deal with the effects of clustering, we calculate the robust 
standard errors of parameter estimates adjusted for clustering. 
                                                
15 We also conducted analyses of health insurance dynamics without weight in 2004 and with weight in 2006. 
The results were consistent and robust, indicating the attrition does not affect the results. We only present the 
results with 2004 weight here.   14 
6  Determinants of health insurance ownership 
6.1  Model specification 
Our  empirical  models  are  based  on  the  basic  model  of  demand  for  health  insurance 
(detailed  in,  for  example,  Cameron  et  al.  (1988),  Deb  et  al.  (1996)  or  (Zweifel  and 
Manning 2000)). Generally, under uncertainty, the consumer seeks to maximize utility by 
choosing health insurance coverage (low or high) prior to the realization of health care 
services. The ex ante utility maximizing choice of health insurance coverage depends on 
income, health status, insurance premiums, prices of other goods, the state of the world and 
exogenous preferences.  
We  use  the  MNL  model  to  examine  individual  choices  over  various  health  insurance 
schemes. From Section 2 we know that the benefits are almost the same between schemes; 
therefore,  there  is  no  incentive  for  individuals  to  have  more  than  one  type  of  health 
insurance policy.
16 The nature of the Vietnam’s health insurance satisfies the requirement 
of  the  MNL  model  that  outcomes  categorized  in  the  dependent  variable  be  mutually 
exclusive. We divide health insurance ownership status into five mutually exclusive states: 
(1)  uninsured,  (2)  insured  under  the  HCFP  scheme,  (3)  insured  under  the  compulsory 
scheme, (4) insured under the student voluntary scheme, and (5) insured under the non-
student voluntary.
17 As discussed in the previous section, the ‘uninsured’ group is set as the 
base group, with the consequence that all other groups are compared to this group.  
                                                
16 The questionnaires for VHLSS04 and 06 also reflect the mutual exclusion among health insurance schemes 
as they allow the respondent to choose only one among listed schemes. 
17 The VHLSSs use information on whether individuals had to buy health insurance themselves or had it 
bought by someone else (for example, provided by the government for free or by their employers) to classify 
which health insurance scheme they are in. Theoretically, this method can precisely classify type of health 
insurance. In practice, it should be noted that at the time of surveys the awareness of people about the 
existence and benefits of health insurance was limited so we may expect some of the insured to misreport 
their types of health insurance. For example, employees in the public sector are granted CHI, so it is odd to 
observe that some of them report having voluntary health insurance. Although the number of these people is 
negligible, the interpretation of any result in this study should take this data limitation into consideration.   15 
Following the literature dealing with income in developing countries, where income data 
are  relatively  scarce,  we  use  per  capita  household  expenditure  to  proxy  for  income. 
Although the VHLSSs have some income information, it is difficult to construct reliable 
income estimates for households where the main income is from self employment or in-
kind remuneration. In addition, expenditure data generally indicate household’s permanent 
income  more  precisely.  To  capture  the  non-linear  relationship  between  income  and 
outcomes, we categorize income into five groups (5 quintiles). We also include type of 
dwelling  in  the  regressions  to  measure  the  impact  of  household  assets  on  insurance 
choices. 
Since  adverse  selection  plays  an  important  role  in  modeling  the  demand  for  health 
insurance, we include a number of health status variables to measure whether there is 
adverse selection in the health insurance program. Adverse selection refers to the case 
where  individuals  differ  according  to  their  health  risk  and  when  faced  with  the  same 
insurance options, persons with higher health risk are more likely to purchase insurance 
since the expected benefits are greater (Akerlof 1970; Arrow 1963; Rothschild and Stiglitz 
1976). We expect individuals in worse health to be more likely to purchase insurance 
ceteris paribus since they have higher expected consumption of health services and higher 
health expenditure. To indirectly identify participants at high risk we use both long-term 
and  short-term  health  status.  Accordingly,  long-term  health  status  is  measured  by  the 
existence of any chronic disease or limitation in functional ability
18 and short-term health 
status is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether the individual had any illness 
in the 12 months before the survey period. In our empirical model, the impact of age on 
                                                
18 The VHLSS06 provides a comprehensive description of an individual’s overall functional health on the 
basis of vision, aural, remembering or concentrating, ambulation (ability to get around), dexterity (use of 
hands and fingers) and communication attributes. For each attribute, four possible responses are recorded: not 
difficult, a little difficult, very difficult and impossible. We classify an individual as one with any limitation 
in functional ability if having a little difficulty or more in any of above attributes.    16 
health insurance demand also represents the health effect as individuals in old age have 
more demand for health care. Following the literature on health insurance, we also use 
information  on  smoking  behavior  as  a  proxy  for  attitude  to  risk  (Barsky  et  al.  1997; 
Buchmueller et al. 2004; Doiron et al. 2008). The smoker is considered as more risk-loving 
and hence less likely to buy health insurance.
19  
Our approach of using the correlation between the individual observable health status and 
the probability of enrolling in the health insurance system to empirically test for adverse 
selection is similar to that in the literature (Ettner 1997; Finkelstein and Poterba 2004; 
Shmueli 2001; Wolfe and Goddeeris 1991). However, since premiums in Vietnam do not 
vary according to risk rating by insurers as in developed countries (Ellis 1998; Ellis and 
McGuire 1986; Newhouse 1996), we believe that the impact of health on the probability of 
purchasing  insurance  more  precisely  reflects  the  existence  of  adverse  selection  in  our 
study.
20   
Variables  are  included  to  reflect  individual  preferences.  These  include  age  (and  its 
squared), gender, marital status, ethnicity and educational background. As suggested by the 
theoretical  models,  premiums  should  be  included  in  the  model  of  health  insurance 
determinants. However, we do not include premiums in the regressions for two reasons. 
First,  premiums  are  not  applicable  for  insurance  schemes  other  than  social  (SHI)  and 
voluntary  (VHI)  schemes.  Second,  under  the  VHI  scheme,  premiums  are  uniform  for 
everybody  after  controlling  for  regional  and  rural/urban  differences.  The  inclusion  of 
                                                
19 Information on smoking, chronic disease or disability is only available in the VHLSS06. We make use of 
our individual panel to assume that individuals who report having ever smoked or having any chronic disease 
or being disabled in 2006 also did so in 2004.  
20 Risk-rating of health insurance premiums means insurers can differentiate premiums according to assessed 
true risk. Due to this premium risk-rating practice, the most common finding in empirical studies in health 
insurance in developed countries is that that healthy people are more likely to be covered by private health 
insurance (see Doiron et al. (2008) for a review).   17 
regional  and  rural/urban  variables  in  the  regressions  therefore  controls  for  this 
heterogeneity in premiums. 
Besides the inclusion of those variables suggested by the standard health insurance models, 
we include other variables that may be useful in explaining health insurance ownership in 
Vietnam. For example, in Vietnam, employment plays a significant role in health insurance 
participation since health insurance is compulsory for employees under labour contracts. 
Since employees with labour contracts are usually wage earners, we use wage employment 
status to measure the impact of employment on health insurance. In addition, we expect the 
impact of employment to be different between the public and private sector. Therefore, we 
include two dummy variables indicating the sector of wage employment. We also include a 
variable indicating whether the individual is at school to examine its impact on insurance 
options.  
Current regulations state that membership of a voluntary health insurance scheme can be 
attained via a number of channels such as institution, community or household. As a result, 
we  include  a  number  of  variables  representing  household  characteristics  such  as  the 
proportion  of  household  members  in  various  age  cohorts  or  health  status  that  may 
influence the likelihood of participation of each member on a household basis. Following 
Wagstaff (2007), we also include two variables describing ethnicity of individuals and 
their  residential  locations  (135  Program  commune)  to  capture  their  impact  on  the   18 
probability  of  receiving  HCFP.
21  Detailed  description  and  summary  statistics  of 
explanatory variables are presented in Appendix Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
[Appendix Table 1 and 2 about here] 
6.2  Regression results 
The estimation results for the models of health insurance determinants in 2004 and 2006 
are presented in Table 3. The estimates are broadly similar for both samples, indicating that 
the  impact  of  these  contributing  factors  is  robust  and  consistent  during  the  period. 
Although we can quantitatively measure the magnitude of the impact of a variable using 
the RRR as discussed in the econometric model section, in order to facilitate the discussion 
currently,  we  refer  to  the  direction  of  the  impact  on  the  propensity  to  have  health 
insurance. 
[Table 3 about here] 
We  first  discuss  the  impact  of  health  on  insurance  choices.  Estimates  of  the  health 
variables show that individuals with bad health are more likely to join the health insurance 
system. In particular, having any illness in the 12 months prior to the survey significantly 
increases  the  probability  of  being  included  in  such  schemes  as  HCFP  (in  2004), 
compulsory  (in  2004  and  2006)  and  student  (in  2004  and  2006).  In  addition,  in  2006 
sample, individuals with any chronic disease or disability were more likely to have HCFP 
or CHI schemes than those without. Furthermore, those with a disability were also more 
likely to enroll in the non-student voluntary scheme than those without in 2006. In line 
                                                
21 Information on whether a commune is classified as a beneficiary of the 135 Program is available in the 
commune information section. In both surveys, the commune questionnaire is asked for all communes in 
rural areas and some communes in urban areas. Although commune information is  not available for all 
communes, the fact that all communes covered by the 135 Program are in rural or remote areas allows us to 
use commune questionnaire to identify Program 135 communes. We do not include a variable indicating 
whether the household is identified by the commune as poor in the regressions since this variable is highly 
correlated with our household expenditure quintile.   19 
with the literature (Noterman et al. 1995; Shalev et al. 2005), we also find that females 
were more likely to join the voluntary scheme in both years because they have a higher risk 
(especially when they are at productive age) than males. The finding that poor health is 
associated  with  higher  probability  of  having  government  subsidized  schemes  such  as 
HCFP or CHI is expected, as these policies are designed to cover those people in difficult 
situations, including those with poor health. The finding that individuals with bad health 
had more chance to receive HCFP is in line with the study of World Bank (2007) which 
shows  the  evidence  of  adverse  selection  created  by  local  authorities  who  misused  the 
HCFP fund by providing health insurance cards to the poor only when they needed medical 
treatment. The finding that individuals with poor health managed to overcome the group-
based enrollment barriers to enroll in VHI is an interesting one. This finding not only 
indicates the existence of adverse selection in the voluntary schemes but also casts doubt 
on  the  effectiveness  of the group-based  participation  requirement which  was set up to 
avoid adverse selection in this scheme.  
Estimates of age variables were also significant and consistent with the effect of health 
status. The higher age was associated with higher probability of enrollment in all types of 
health insurance (except HCFP scheme in 2006). The impact of age, however, is not linear 
for  the  insured  under  the  voluntary  groups  (both  student  and  non-student)  since  the 
estimate  of  the  age  squared  variable  is  significantly  positive  and  smaller  than  one, 
indicating that when the insured get older, they may withdraw from their schemes. Take 
the student voluntary scheme for example. Students have a higher probability of joining 
their designed scheme as they advance in their study. Student participation, however, starts 
to fall at some point, such as when they finish study, when they switch to other schemes or 
leave the health insurance system.    20 
Smoking appears to significantly affect health insurance choices. Smokers are less likely to 
have CHI and VHI than non-smokers. The negative impact of smoking on the probability 
of possessing CHI can be explained by occupation choice where non-smokers are more 
likely to choose the public sector that has a higher compliance rate in providing CHI for its 
employees (Ettner 1997; Savage and Wright 2003). In contrast, smoking does not affect 
the probability of having HCFP. This is to be expected as smoking behavior is not one of 
the criteria to be eligible for HCFP.  
Income  (as  measured  by  per  capita  household  expenditure)  also  exerts  a  statistically 
significant influence, but  in the opposite direction,  on the probability of being insured 
under different schemes. On the one hand, individuals in better off households are less 
likely to be included in HCFP. Individuals in upper expenditure quintile households, on the 
other hand, have a higher probability of having compulsory and voluntary (both student 
and non-student) insurance. One interpretation of the income effects in the demand for 
compulsory and voluntary schemes is that these effects result from the HCFP programs 
that serve as social protection for the poor. Poor persons know that they can qualify for 
HCFP  so  they  do  not  bother  purchasing  voluntary  health  insurance.  Alternatively,  the 
positive  relationship  between  income  and  the  probability  of  having  voluntary  health 
insurance indicates that this kind of health insurance is a normal good. On the positive 
impact of wealth on the probability of having VHI, our results are consistent with those 
studies in developed countries where wealthier individuals are more likely to purchase 
private health insurance (Cameron and Trivedi 1991; Hurd and McGarry 1997; Propper 
1989; Savage and Wright 2003).  
In  line  with  the  impact  of  income  on  the  probability  of  having  alternative  schemes, 
education also significantly affects the chance of being covered. In particular, individuals   21 
with higher education are more likely to join the compulsory, student and non-student 
voluntary schemes. In contrast, higher education is associated with lower probability of 
having HCFP.  
By law, compulsory health insurance must be provided for wage earners. Therefore, it is 
not surprising to observe that workers in the formal sector are found to have a much higher 
probability (from nine to 59 times higher) of receiving this kind of insurance than their 
counterparts who are self-employed or unemployed. It is, however, interesting to find that 
wage earners in the public sector have significantly higher probability (more than four 
times higher) of receiving CHI than their counterparts in the private sector. This can be 
explained by the much higher compliance rate in the public sector than in the private sector 
(World Bank 2007). The gap in the compliance rate between the two sectors appears to 
have narrowed over the period since the ratio of the impact between the public and private 
sector decreased from about 5.7 times in 2004 to 4.2 times in 2006. 
Current schooling status significantly affects the probability of purchasing student health 
insurance. Students had 17 (in 2004) to 20 times (in 2006) higher probability than people 
currently not at school. Also, as designed by the HCFP program, an individual living in a 
commune  indentified  as  a  beneficiary  of  Decision  135  and  being  an  ethnic  minority 
individual has a significantly higher probability of receiving the HCFP. Being an ethnic 
minority individual however reduces the chance of purchasing student (in both years) and 
non-student (in 2006) voluntary insurance. 
Residents in urban areas have a higher chance of being covered by the HCFP, compulsory 
and student schemes than their counterparts in rural areas. On the contrary, no significant 
difference is found between rural and urban residents’ behavior in purchasing non-student 
voluntary insurance. Urban residents tend to work for formal sectors more often than rural   22 
ones and these sectors provide CHI so the former have more chance of receiving this kind 
of insurance. Why urban residents are more likely to participate HCFP seems surprising as 
rural areas are poorer and mainly targeted by the HCFP program. This finding casts doubt 
over the targeting of the HCFP program.  
7  Dynamics of health insurance ownership 
7.1  Model specification 
We start investigating the dynamics of health insurance ownership by specifying a baseline 
model that contains only variables measuring initial conditions. By so doing, we remove 
all  possible  problems  of  endogeneity  and  also  test  the  robustness  of  the  model  when 
variables that capture ‘changes’ are introduced.
22 The initial variables are similar to those 
in the health insurance determinant models. Variables describing changes are suggested 
from the health insurance determinant models and change over time. These are changes in 
employment status, changes in schooling status and changes in income. These ‘change’ 
variables  are  expected  to  be  exogenous  in  our  empirical  models  since  there  is  little 
evidence that the Vietnamese people choose whether to leave school or change their work  
for health insurance reasons (Jowett et al. 2003; Trivedi 2004). Accordingly, we add these 
‘change’ variables in the model of health insurance dynamics and classify them as follows: 
Changes in school status: the change of an individual’s schooling between 2004 and 2006 
is classified into four mutually exclusive states: individuals who were not at school in both 
2004 and 2006 (never at school, the base group), individuals who were not at school in 
2004 but at school in 2006 (enrolling at school), individuals who were at school in 2004 
but not at school in 2006 (leaving school), individuals who were at school in both 2004 and 
2006 (remaining at school). 
                                                
22  Our  approach  is  similar  to  Wolfe  and  Goddeeris  (1991)  where  we  both  study  the  impact  of  past 
characteristics on the current insurance decision. This paper, however, makes a significant improvement in 
this approach by looking at the impact of past characteristics on the dynamics of health insurance status.   23 
Changes in wage work: the change of an individual’s employment status between 2004 
and 2006 is classified into four mutually exclusive states: individuals who were not wage 
earners in both 2004 and 2006 (never be a wage earner, the base group), individuals who 
were not wage earners in 2004 but were in 2006 (becoming a wage earner), individuals 
who were wage earners in 2004 but not in 2006 (becoming a non-wage earner), individuals 
who were wage earners in both 2004 and 2006 (remaining a wage earner). These variables 
are constructed separately for private and public sectors. 
Changes in income: changes in income are measured by the change in the per capita 
household real expenditure adjusted by price indexes of regions and survey months.  
7.2  Health insurance dynamics of the uninsured in 2004, by scheme 
We now turn to analyze the dynamics of health insurance ownership in Vietnam over the 
2004-06 period. To allow for the possibility of choice among various schemes, we divide 
the individuals by their initial health insurance status: uninsured or insured in 2004. We 
use the first sub-sample of the uninsured in 2004 to investigate which factors drove an 
uninsured individual in 2004 to (1) remain uninsured in 2006, or become insured in 2006 
under  such  schemes  as (2)  HCFP,  (3)  CHI,  (4)  student  voluntary  and  (5)  non-student 
voluntary. To analyze all possible choices of individuals who started the 2004 – 06 period 
as uninsured we also use the MNL model for this sub-sample. In running this model, the 
status of remaining uninsured in 2006 is set as the benchmark group, resulting in all other 
groups being compared with this group. 
We  report  the  estimates  for  the  health  insurance  dynamic  models  for  the  sample  of 
individuals who were uninsured in 2004 in Table 4. This table shows factors contributing 
to  the  movement  of  the  uninsured  to  become  insured  under  a  particular  scheme.  We 
discuss their movement to one of four insurance schemes in turn.   24 
[Table 4 about here] 
From uninsured in 2004 to insured under HCFP in 2006: Estimation results for the 
baseline  and  extended  models  are  shown  in  the  first  and  fifth  columns  of  Table  4, 
respectively. These results, in general, mirror the growth of the HCFP program during a 
period where uninsured individuals belonging to an ethnic  minority group  or living in 
poorer households or  in 135-Program communes had a  higher  probability of receiving 
HCFP by 2006. In addition, less educated individuals were more likely to be covered by 
HCFP. The uninsured with a chronic disease or disability were also more likely to receive 
HCFP  during  the  period.  This  finding  supports  the  evidence  of  adverse  selection  in  
‘becoming insured’ under the HCFP group. Regarding the impact of income dynamics, we 
see that individuals living in households that experienced an improvement in income had a 
lower probability of receiving HCFP. In particular, an increase of one million VND in 
income during the period was expected to decrease the probability of receiving HCFP by 
17 per cent.  
From uninsured in 2004 to insured under CHI in 2006: The results (columns 2 and 6 in 
Table 4) show that the movement into CHI is significantly associated with changes in 
employment status. In particular, uninsured people were more likely to become insured 
under CHI when they had been or had started working in the formal wage sector (public 
and private). Again the impact of public sector employment on the probability of becoming 
insured under CHI was much higher than that of the private sector. This confirms one of 
our earlier findings of the lower compliance rate in the private sector. Using those who 
remain  uninsured  in  2006  as  a  benchmark  point  of  comparison,  then  those  becoming 
covered by CHI in 2006 tend to be better educated and those becoming insured under 
HCFP are less educated than the benchmark case. In contrast, variables representing initial   25 
wealth and increase in wealth are insignificant in explaining the movements into CHI. Also 
we do not find significant evidence of adverse selection in this group since all observable 
health variables are insignificant. 
From  uninsured  in  2004  to  insured  under  the  student  voluntary  scheme  in  2006: 
Insignificant estimates of health variables suggest no evidence of health based selection in 
the choice of moving into the student voluntary insurance (see columns 3 and 7 in Table 
4). As designed by the scheme, becoming insured under the student scheme is significantly 
associated with  schooling status where individuals  who  started or have been at school 
during the period had a much higher probability of being covered than never-at-school 
individuals. Kinh or Chinese students were more likely to join this scheme than other 
ethnic minority students. Higher initial wealth or an improvement in wealth over the period 
also increased the probability of becoming insured under this voluntary scheme. 
From uninsured in 2004 to insured under the non-student voluntary scheme in 2006: 
The results (columns 4 and 8 in Table 4) also provide evidence of adverse selection in the 
market  for  non-student  voluntary  health  insurance.  In  comparison  with  the  ‘remaining 
uninsured’ individuals, those who purchased non-student voluntary health insurance were 
significantly more likely (100 per cent higher) to have a chronic disease. Furthermore, it is 
interesting  to  observe  the  impact  of  group-based  requirements  on  the  choice  of  other 
household  members,  since  individuals  living  in  households  with  a  higher  share  of  ill 
members were more likely to move into the voluntary scheme by 2006. The latter finding 
not only provides evidence of adverse selection but also indicates the significant impact of 
group-base requirement in reducing adverse selection in VHI where healthy members in 
the household have to become insured for ill members to be eligible to enroll as specified 
by the household-group base. In contrast to the individuals becoming insured under the   26 
HCFP, those becoming insured under the non-student voluntary scheme were wealthier 
and sometimes more educated (for example, the uninsured in 2004 with a secondary school 
degree). The uninsured who started working for the public sector during the period were 
more likely to have non-student voluntary health insurance before 2006 than those who 
never worked in the public sector.  
7.3  Health insurance dynamics of the insured in 2004, by scheme 
We use the sub-sample of the insured in 2004 to examine the possible link between their 
initial  conditions  in  2004  with  their  subsequent  insurance  choices  during  the  2004-06 
period. In order to examine factors determining the insured’s choice of (1) staying in their 
current scheme, or (2) moving to another scheme (i.e. still being insured but under another 
scheme)
23  or  (3)  becoming  uninsured,  we  separately  estimate  MNL  models  for  sub-
samples of the insured in 2004 under different schemes. Accordingly, the sub-sample of 
the insured in 2004 is then divided further by type of health insurance scheme into four 
sub-samples of the insured under: HCFP, CHI, student and non-student voluntary scheme. 
For each scheme, the first group (remained insured under the same scheme) is set as the 
benchmark group, resulting in other groups being compared with this group.  
The estimation results in Tables 4 to 7 for movements of individuals who started the period 
as the insured are consistent with the results explaining the behavior of individuals who 
started  as  the  uninsured.  In  general,  those  factors  that  influenced  the  uninsured  to  be 
covered by the health insurance system are also the main determinants explaining why they 
left the system. 
The insured under HCFP in 2004 (results are reported in Table 5): the probability of 
moving out of the HCFP scheme (either to another scheme or becoming uninsured) was 
                                                
23 We do not separate this state further by defining the destination scheme because in some cases, the number 
of individuals moving into any specific scheme is so small that the MNL loses its precision.    27 
higher for  individuals who belonged  to the  Kinh or  Chinese  ethnic group, or lived  in 
wealthier households or in communes that were not a beneficiary of the 135 Program. In 
addition, we find evidence of adverse selection in the HCFP where individuals with a 
chronic condition, while having the same probability of transferring to another scheme, had 
a  significantly  lower  probability  of  becoming  uninsured  in  the  subsequent  period  than 
those in the benchmark group (remaining insured under the HCFP). Regarding the impact 
of  change  variables  on  health  insurance  dynamics,  changes  in  schooling  status  or 
employment  were  found  to  increase  the  probability  of  moving  to  another  scheme 
(probably,  the  student  or  CHI)  but  not  moving  out  of  the  health  insurance  system.  In 
particular, individuals who became or remained as students during the period were more 
likely to move (probably to the student scheme) than those who did not. Similarly, those 
who became or remained as state employees had a higher chance of transfer to another 
scheme (most likely to CHI). Interestingly, individuals living in better-off households were 
more  likely  to  switch  to  another  scheme.  All  change  variables,  however,  were  not 
significant determinants of becoming uninsured. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The insured under CHI in 2004 (results are reported in Table 6): As before, wealth 
appears to be one of the driving forces in the insurance decision: higher income and better 
educated individuals are less likely to  divert to  another scheme or  become uncovered. 
Insured individuals living in a 135-Program commune have a much higher probability (400 
per cent higher) to make the shift (mostly likely to HCFP) than their counterparts in a more 
advantageous commune. The sector of employment, as shown in the determinant models of 
participation in CHI, is also found to have a significant impact on the movement out of 
CHI. In particular, the insured that work in the public or private formal sector for the whole   28 
period or start working for the formal private sector during the period have a much lower 
probability of transferring to another scheme or becoming uninsured. One concern is that 
the  insured  who  left  the  state  sector  during  the  period  were  more  likely  to  become 
uninsured than those who never worked for the state. Regarding the negative impact of 
leaving the state sector and dropping out of the health insurance system, it can be inferred 
that leaving the sector is equivalent to losing health insurance status. An increase in wealth 
as  measured by a change in per capita expenditure  during the period, however, is not 
statistically  significantly  associated  with  the  movement  of  the  insured  under  CHI.  In 
addition, there is no evidence of health based selection in the choice of moving out of this 
scheme since the health variables are not significant in all cases. 
[Table 6 about here] 
The insured under the student voluntary scheme in 2004 (results are reported in Table 
7): We find evidence of adverse selection in the student scheme where the insured with 
bad  health  (as  measured  by  having  any  illness  in  2004)  were  less  likely  to  become 
uninsured than healthier members. In addition, the insured with a disability were more 
likely to switch to another scheme (probably HCFP or CHI). Smoking behavior has a 
significantly impact on enrollment (as found in the health insurance determinant models) 
and also on the movement out of the student scheme since the insured who have smoked 
were more likely to become uninsured at the end of the study period. Other variables in the 
regressions have their expected signs. For example, the insured under the student scheme 
who are better educated or wealthier are less likely to shift to another scheme or leave the 
health insurance system. Additionally, belonging to an ethnic minority group or living in a 
135-Program commune significantly increases the probability of shifting (mostly likely to 
HCFP). In contrast, the insured in urban areas are less likely to become uninsured than   29 
their  rural  counterparts.  As  expected,  insured  individuals  who  have  been  or  become 
students during the period have a lower probability of transferring to another scheme or 
becoming  uninsured.  Unlike  the  negative  impact  of  leaving  the  state  sector  on  the 
probability  of  becoming  uninsured,  for  those  who  start  as  the  insured  under  the  CHI, 
school termination does not necessarily mean the end of student insurance coverage since 
students who left school during the period still had a lower probability of transferring to 
another scheme or becoming uninsured, than individuals who never attended school during 
the period. 
[Table 7 about here] 
The insured under the non-student voluntary scheme in 2004 (results are reported in 
Table  8):  The  insignificant  impact  of  health  variables  on  the  movement  out  of  the 
voluntary scheme indicates that there is no significant evidence of adverse selection in this 
group. The sector of employment or schooling status again plays an important role in 
transferring from VHI to the student or compulsory scheme. As in the case of the student 
scheme, an increase in income does not seem to impact on the decision to transfer to 
another scheme or quit the health insurance system. 
[Table 8 about here] 
8  Conclusion 
This study uses longitudinal data from VHLSS 2004 and 2006 to investigate the static and 
dynamic determinants of health insurance ownership in Vietnam during this period. The 
results  from  the  static  models  of  health  insurance  determinants  show  that  wealth  and 
education have a significant impact on the probability of having health insurance. Higher 
wealth  or  education  is  negatively  associated  with  the  probability  of  having  HCFP  but   30 
positively associated with CHI and VHI. The results from the dynamic models of health 
insurance ownership also suggest the importance of income and education in determining 
the movement in or out of a particular scheme. Higher initial income or an improvement in 
wealth during the period reduces the probability of remaining or becoming insured under 
HCFP. Higher initial income, however, raises the probability of becoming covered under 
CHI or VHI.  
The  results  from  the  static  models  of  health  insurance  determinants  show  significant 
adverse  selection  in  the  current  health  insurance  system  where  individuals  with  worse 
health are more likely to be insured. In addition, adverse selection exists in all schemes. 
The results from the dynamic models of health insurance ownership also suggest that the 
current  health  insurance  system  entails  significant  adverse  selection  since  people  with 
worse health are more likely to join and stay in the system. Taken together, our results 
suggest that the current health insurance system contains significant adverse selection. The 
finding  of  adverse  selection  in  the  voluntary  schemes  indicates  that  those  polices 
implemented  to  address  adverse  selection  have  not  been  sucesseful.  The  problem  of 
adverse selection is expected to worsen after the beginning of 2008 when the group-based 
requirements  for  enrollment  in  voluntary  schemes  are  removed.  The  health  insurance 
system will not be sustainable unless the problem of adverse selection is resolved (Cutler 
and Zeckhauser 2000).  
From the findings of this paper, some policy implications to increase coverage and to 
maintain financial sustainability of the health insurance system are drawn. First, to increase 
coverage, partial subsidization of participation in VHI should be given for individuals in 
financially  disadvantageous  groups.  This  suggestion  is  supported  by  the  finding  of  a 
significant impact of wealth on the probability of moving in, moving out or staying at VHI.   31 
Therefore,  results  of  this  study  give  support  for  the  government’s  recent  approach  to 
provide  partial  subsidies  for  those  in  financially  disadvantageous  groups  such  as 
individuals  in  near  poor  households,  farmers  and  students.
24  Second,  another  way  of 
increasing coverage is to make health insurance compulsory. This policy has been applied 
to  employees  in  the formal  sector,  the  poor and  children aged  under  seven.  It  can  be 
extended  to  other  groups  such  as  students  or  individuals  in  households  that  have  any 
member  currently  holding  CHI.  The  legalized  inclusion  of  those  individuals  into  CHI 
should be used in conjunction with the first policy suggestion to subsidize the participation 
of  disadvantageous  groups.  Third,  since  there  is  under-compliance  in  health  insurance 
issuance in the private formal sector, stricter measures to improve law enforcement should 
be implemented to motivate the healthy population from this sector to participate in the 
health insurance system. 
One may argue that once universal coverage has been achieved, adverse selection could be 
eliminated.  However,  experience  from  the  implementation  of  the  HCFP  program  in 
Vietnam shows that, without substantial financial resources from the central government 
and concrete implementation policies, universal coverage will be a long time coming. On 
the way towards universal coverage, the financial sustainability of the health insurance 
system  needs  to  be  maintained.  One  of  the  measures  to  strengthen  the  financial 
sustainability of the health insurance system is to introduce and maintain a co-payment 
rate. The introduction of co-payment rate is important because it helps prevent patients 
from choosing more care than clinically required (moral hazard) and health care providers 
from  supplying  more  care  (supplier-induced  demand).  Another  measure  to  maintain 
financial sustainability is to reduce adverse selection in the health insurance system. In 
                                                
24 According to the join circular number 10/2008/TTLT-BYT-BTC dated 24/09/2008, households with per 
capita income above the poverty line but not over 130 per cent of the poverty line are defined as near poor. 
These households are subsidized at least 50 per cent of health insurance premium, which is set at 3 per cent 
of minimum wage.    32 
order  to  reduce  adverse  selection,  there  are  several  policy  implications  based  on  the 
findings of this analysis. One of the measures is to maintain group-base requirements. 
Although  the  empirical  results  show  that  group  base  requirements  could  not  totally 
eliminate  adverse  selection,  there  is  some  evidence  indicating  the  importance  of  the 
household-base  requirement  in  reducing  adverse  selection  in  VHI.  Those  policies  to 
strengthen law enforcement to increase health insurance coverage in the private formal 
sector could also help reduce adverse selection.    33 
Table 1: Components of Vietnam health insurance system, 2009 
Scheme  Targeted population  Financing  Variations of benefit 
package 
       
Civil servants  and employees 
in the formal sector  
3 % salary (2 % paid by 
employer and 1 % by 
employee) 
 
Pensioners  3 % of monthly allowances, 
paid by VSS with subsidies 
from state budget 
Cover 100 % for all 
treatment under VND 
20 million 
Meritorious people  3 % of minimum wage, paid 
from state budget 
No limit on the value 
of treatment 



































     
































  The poor  Central government budget (75 
%) and provincial budget (25 
%) 
 
       
Students  VND 40,000 – 70,000 (urban). 
VND 30,000 – 50,000 (rural). 



































Others (non-students)  VND 100,000 – 160,000 
(urban). VND 70,000 – 120,000 
(rural). Paid by enrollee. 
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Other voluntary (left axis)
HCFP (left axis)
Percentage of population insured (right axis)
 
Source: Data for 1993 to 2005 are combined from World Bank (2001 and 2007). Data for 2006 are from 
Vietnam Social Security.   35 
Table 2 Matrix of health insurance ownership dynamics in Vietnam, 2004 –2006 
(percentage of 15504 individuals in the panel sample) 
        2006 
        Uninsured    Insured    Total 
       
  By scheme     













































     
Uninsured  Total  42.1    18.7  7.3  2.7  4.7  4.0    60.8 
                       
Total  7.4    31.7  10.6  8.8  11.4  0.9    39.1 
HCFP  2.7    10.1  8.6  0.9  0.4  0.2    12.8 
CHI  0.7    8.3  0.9  7.0  0.1  0.3    9.0 














0.3    1.1  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.3    1.4 






Total      49.5    50.4  17.9  11.5  16.1  4.9    100.0 
     
Note:   - Population means weighted to reflect sampling weights.  
Source: own-calculation from the VHLSS 04 and 06. 
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Table 3 Determinants of health insurance ownership, 2004 - 2006 
  2004    2006 
Variables  HCFP  CHI  Student  Other 
Voluntary    HCFP  CHI  Student  Other 
Voluntary 
Individual characteristics                   
Age  1.01*  1.06***  1.15*  1.04***    1.00  1.07***  1.13*  1.07*** 
Age squared  1.00  1.00  0.99***  1.00       1.00  1.00  0.99***  0.99*** 
Male  1.06  1.02  1.02  0.75**     0.99  1.09  1.12*  0.81*** 
Married  0.72***  0.82  0.21***  0.66*      0.73***  0.86  0.40***  1.42*** 
Kinh  0.41***  0.72  1.98***  1.33       0.30***  0.86  1.41*  1.75*   
No education(the base)                   
Primary education
  0.85*  1.15  1.27**  1.48*      0.80***  1.51***  1.34**  1.14    
Lower secondary  0.75**  1.78***  2.23***  1.86***    0.76**  2.76***  2.75***  1.46*** 
Upper secondary  0.78  2.10***  3.51***  2.39***    0.65***  2.85***  6.03***  1.74*** 
University and higher  1.23  7.61***  12.48***  4.58***    1.00  15.41***  14.00***  1.68    
Training  1.80  2.88***  2.77***  2.09***    1.14  3.38***  1.55  1.04    
Ill  1.14**  1.43***  1.23*  1.15       1.06  1.26**  1.48***  1.05    
Chronic            1.66***  1.53***  1.24  1.78*** 
Disable            1.41***  1.32***  1.27  1.14    
Smoking            0.96  0.80**  0.56**  0.71*** 
At school  1.24*  1.95***  17.33***  2.10***    1.76***  2.38***  20.08***  0.82    
Private wage  1.06  9.10***  0.16***  3.08***    1.03  13.59***  0.35***  1.25    
Public wage  1.84***  51.35***  1.22  9.35***    1.89***  58.65***  0.57  2.72*** 
Household characteristics                   
Household size  0.99  0.97  1.00  0.91       0.93**  0.99  1.01  1.03    
Proportion of children age 
under 7 
0.94  1.29  0.86  2.93*      1.00  2.29*  0.82  1.63    
Proportion of children aged 
7 to 17 
2.12***  0.77  1.26  1.62       1.54*  0.55*  0.86  1.08    
Proportion of elderly  1.93***  1.20  1.56  0.48*      1.03  1.19  1.38  1.40    
Proportion of people ill  0.88  0.77*  0.85  1.01       1.15  0.81*  0.71**  1.03    
Poor (the base)                   
Near poor  0.54***  0.93  1.81***  0.75       0.47***  0.89  1.64***  1.68**  
Average  0.39***  1.17  2.52***  1.46       0.26***  0.95  2.10***  2.10*** 
Better-off  0.35***  1.64***  3.71***  1.81*      0.23***  1.47*  3.49***  3.06*** 
Rich  0.29***  2.17***  4.53***  2.15**     0.13***  1.88**  4.10***  4.18*** 
Temporary house (the base)                   
Semi-permanent house  0.64***  0.83  0.92  1.10       0.56***  0.97  1.27*  1.03    
Permanent house  0.47***  0.70**  1.03  1.18       0.36***  0.77  1.23  0.93    
Commune characteristics                   
Urban  1.51***  1.35**  1.35**  1.11       1.18*  1.24***  1.46***  1.04    
Commune 135  2.68***  2.96***  0.75*  2.90**     3.97***  1.41  0.77*  0.95    
                   
No of observations  36749                 35626              
Log pseudo likelihood  -24993                 -26642              
Pseudo R-Square  0.40            0.44       
Note:   - Uninsured is set as the base group; Regional variables are included. 
- Population means weighted to reflect sampling weights; - Relative Risk Ratio is reported. 
- ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Source: own-calculation from the VHLSS 04 and 06.   37 
Table 4 Health insurance ownership dynamics: the uninsured in 2004 
  Baseline model    Extended model 
Variables  HCFP  CHI  Student  Voluntary    HCFP  CHI  Student  Voluntary 
Individual characteristics                   
Age  0.97**  0.97  0.79**  1.07***    0.97**  0.99  0.91  1.07*** 
Age squared  1.00*  1.00***  1.00  1.00**     1.00*  1.00*  1.00  1.00**  
Male  0.83  0.68**  0.98  0.90       0.83  0.68**  1.05  0.90    
Married  0.99  0.50**  0.15*  1.35       1.01  0.70  0.18  1.42    
Kinh  0.49*  1.04  1.82  1.93       0.52*  0.99  2.05*  1.92    
Primary education
(a)  0.78  1.29  1.64*  1.15       0.79  1.38  1.00  1.14    
Lower secondary
(a)  0.63***  2.46***  3.57***  1.08       0.65**  2.18**  1.51  1.06    
Upper secondary
(a)  0.58*  4.63***  12.19***  1.80**     0.60*  2.40*  1.70  1.66*   
University and higher
(a)  0.00  17.50***  26.84***  1.05       0.00***  11.67***  1.37  0.95    
Training  1.50  1.97*  0.00***  0.96       1.58*  1.69  0.00***  0.92    
Ill  1.00  0.95  0.94  1.24       0.99  0.83  1.06  1.23    
Chronic  1.53***  1.18  1.23  2.04***    1.58***  1.20  1.62  2.01*** 
Disable  1.44**  1.03  0.70  1.01       1.46**  1.17  0.84  1.02    
Smoking  0.98  1.12  0.29**  0.74       0.97  0.99  0.53  0.73    
Household characteristics                   
HH head  1.25*  1.50*  0.00***  0.91       1.26*  1.64*  0.00***  0.91    
HH size  0.94  1.05  1.00  1.04       0.94  1.05  1.03  1.04    
Proportion of children age under 7  1.31  0.82  0.78  1.04       0.99  1.09  0.92  1.09    
Proportion of children aged 7 to 17  1.57  0.42*  0.90  1.34       1.40  0.43*  0.91  1.30    
Proportion of elderly  1.36  0.97  2.61  1.39       1.19  1.18  1.48  1.41    
Proportion of people ill  1.01*  0.94  1.20  1.17**       1.03**  1.03  1.23  1.17**    
Near poor
(b)  0.58***  0.67  1.92*  1.88       0.56***  0.61  1.81*  1.86    
Average
(b)  0.36***  0.97  2.26**  2.32**     0.33***  0.86  1.93*  2.30**  
Better-off
(b)  0.30***  1.13  2.68**  2.70**     0.25***  1.00  2.64**  2.70**  
Rich
(b)  0.22***  1.13  1.79  4.22***    0.11***  0.92  1.84  4.27*** 
Semi-permanent house
(c)  0.47***  0.85  0.89  0.97       0.49***  0.88  0.82  0.96    
Permanent house
(c)  0.21***  0.65*  0.91  0.93       0.22***  0.71  0.68  0.91    
Commune characteristics                   
Urban  1.57  1.43**  1.33  1.25       1.80*  1.48*  1.25  1.24    
Commune 135  4.71***  1.40  1.44  1.49       4.85***  1.35  1.35  1.48    
“Change” variables                          
At school  1.43*  1.81*  2.91***  0.54              
Private wage  0.97  4.72***  0.53  0.57              
Public wage  1.11  15.79***  0.66  1.89              
Enrolling school
(d)                   1.07  1.36  238.25***  0.83    
Leaving school
(d)            1.45  1.71  10.42***  0.32*   
Remaining at school
(d)            1.38  2.93***  169.48***  0.74    
Becoming a wage earner (public)
 (e)            1.65  80.56***  0.80  6.05*** 
Becoming a non-wage earner (public)
 (e)            0.84  3.30*  0.32  1.46    
Remaining a wage earner (public)
 (e)            1.72  80.18***  0.00  2.80    
Becoming a wage earner (private)
 (f)            1.10  27.24***  1.04  1.52    
Becoming a non-wage earner (private)
 (f)            0.77  1.02  0.81  0.49    
Remaining a wage earner (private)
 (f)            1.20  24.66***  0.00***  0.57    
Income increase            0.83***  0.99  1.12*  1.02    
No of observations  9129          9129               
Log pseudo likelihood  -6603          -6117               
Pseudo R-Square  0.29          0.35          
Note:   - Remaining uninsured is set as the base group; Regional variables are included. 
- 
(a): No education; 
(b): Poor; 
(c): Temporary house; 
(d): never at school; 
(e): never be a wage-earner in the public sector; 
(f): never be 
a wage-earner in the private sector are set as the base group, respectively. 
- Population means weighted to reflect sampling weights; - Relative Risk Ratio is reported. 
- ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Source: own-calculation from the VHLSS 04 and 06.   38 
Table 5 Health insurance ownership dynamics: the insured under HCFP in 2004 
  Baseline model    Extended model 
Variables  Another scheme  Uninsured       Another scheme  Uninsured    
Individual characteristics           
Age  0.92*  0.98       0.97  0.98    
Age squared  1.00**  1.00       1.00  1.00    
Male  0.82  0.78       0.76  0.77    
Married  1.82  1.43       1.73  1.52    
Kinh  4.09**  3.74**     3.96**  3.72**  
Primary education
(a)  1.28  1.09       1.28  1.04    
Lower secondary
(a)  1.65*  1.08       1.97**  0.98    
Upper secondary
(a)  1.66  1.10       1.23  0.96    
University and higher
(a)  2.54  0.00***    4.37  0.00*** 
Training  6.00**  1.29       6.02**  1.30    
Ill  0.81  0.90       0.79  0.90    
Chronic  0.74  0.37***    0.67  0.38*** 
Disable  1.28  0.84       1.30  0.81    
Smoking  1.08  1.33       1.18  1.33    
Household characteristics           
HH head  1.55*  0.93       1.57  0.97    
HH size  0.96  1.00       0.97  1.00    
Proportion of children age under 7  1.24  0.69       2.24  0.79    
Proportion of children aged 7 to 17  1.83  0.94       1.81  1.06    
Proportion of elderly  0.60  0.49       0.61  0.52    
Proportion of people ill  1.12  0.48*      1.06  0.49*   
Near poor
(b)  1.41  1.60       1.48  1.63    
Average
(b)  2.36*  2.12*      2.31*  2.23*   
Better-off
(b)  5.58***  2.36*      6.53***  2.56*   
Rich
(b)  9.51**  4.21       14.00**  4.90    
Semi-permanent house
(c)  2.04  2.18**     2.02  2.14**  
Permanent house
(c)  2.05  2.79       1.29  2.66    
Commune characteristics           
Urban  1.51  1.08       1.38  1.07    
Commune 135  0.37**  0.32***    0.36**  0.32*** 
“Change” variables           
At school  1.88  0.51          
Private wage  0.48  0.70          
Public wage  4.45*  3.00*         
Enrolling school
(d)                       8.79**  1.02    
Leaving school
(d)                       0.45  0.89    
Remaining at school
(d)        7.13***  0.39*   
Becoming a wage earner (public)
 (e)        12.07**  1.45    
Becoming a non-wage earner (public)
 (e)        3.53  4.24    
Remaining a wage earner (public)
 (e)        5.54*  2.27    
Becoming a wage earner (private)
 (f)        3.11  1.64    
Becoming a non-wage earner (private)
 (f)        0.21  0.94    
Remaining a wage earner (private)
 (f)        0.61  0.51    
Income increase        1.18***  1.04    
No of observations  2306      2306                  
Log pseudo likelihood  -1455      -1409                  
Pseudo R-Square  0.26      0.28      
Note:   - Remaining insured under HCFPI is set as the base group; Regional variables are included. 
- 
(a): No education; 
(b): Poor; 
(c): Temporary house; 
(d): never at school; 
(e): never be a wage-earner in the public sector; 
(f): never 
be a wage-earner in the private sector are set as the base group, respectively. 
- Population means weighted to reflect sampling weights; - Relative Risk Ratio is reported. 
- ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Source: own-calculation from the VHLSS 04 and 06.   39 
Table 6 Health insurance ownership dynamics: the insured under CHI in 2004 
  Baseline model    Extended model 
Variables  Another 
scheme  Uninsured    Another 
scheme  Uninsured 
Individual characteristics           
Age  0.93*  0.98       0.90*  0.93    
Age squared  1.00  1.00       1.00  1.00    
Male  1.38  1.56       1.37  1.62    
Married  0.93  0.68       1.00  0.85    
Kinh  0.53  0.53       0.50  0.57    
Primary education
(a)  0.42*  0.45       0.45  0.56    
Lower secondary
(a)  0.99  0.45       1.08  0.47    
Upper secondary
(a)  0.60  0.31**     0.90  0.57    
University and higher
(a)  0.40  0.04***    0.65  0.08*** 
Training  0.58  0.46*      0.58  0.44    
Ill  1.09  1.72       1.07  1.66    
Chronic  0.72  1.02       0.78  1.20    
Disable  1.35  0.95       1.21  0.89    
Smoking  0.71  0.80       0.67  0.72    
Household characteristics           
HH head  0.86  0.51*      0.84  0.45**  
HH size  0.92  1.04       0.91  1.07    
Proportion of children age under 7  3.18  0.12       5.63  0.10    
Proportion of children aged 7 to 17  1.83  0.75       2.95  1.15    
Proportion of elderly  1.70  1.06       2.12  1.47    
Proportion of people ill  1.55  0.37*      1.65  0.38*   
Near poor
(b)  0.47  0.18**     0.46  0.17**  
Average
(b)  0.32**  0.28*      0.28**  0.23**  
Better-off
(b)  0.30*  0.29*      0.30*  0.29*   
Rich
(b)  0.37  0.18*      0.35  0.14*   
Semi-permanent house
(c)  0.59  1.25       0.54  1.08    
Permanent house
(c)  0.59  0.60       0.60  0.52    
Commune characteristics           
Urban  1.18  1.43       1.06  1.33    
Commune 135  4.73***  1.44       4.97***  1.35    
“Change” variables           
At school  1.14  0.50          
Private wage  0.38  1.10          
Public wage  0.09***  0.61          
Enrolling school
(d)                       0.26***  0.29    
Leaving school
(d)                       0.60  0.64    
Remaining at school
(d)        0.61  0.15    
Becoming a wage earner (public)
 (e)        0.32  0.23    
Becoming a non-wage earner (public)
 (e)        0.84  3.57*** 
Remaining a wage earner (public)
 (e)        0.03***  0.10*** 
Becoming a wage earner (private)
 (f)        0.08**  0.20*   
Becoming a non-wage earner (private)
 (f)        0.60  3.96    
Remaining a wage earner (private)
 (f)        0.21*  0.30*   
Income increase        0.99  0.98    
No of observations  1436      1436                  
Log pseudo likelihood  -662      -606                  
Pseudo R-Square  0.32       0.38   
Note:   - Remaining insured under CHI is set as the base group; Regional variables are included. 
- 
(a): No education; 
(b): Poor; 
(c): Temporary house; 
(d): never at school; 
(e): never be a wage-earner in the public 
sector; 
(f): never be a wage-earner in the private sector are set as the base group, respectively. 
- Population means weighted to reflect sampling weights; - Relative Risk Ratio is reported. 
- ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Source: own-calculation from the VHLSS 04 and 06.   40 
 
Table 7 Health insurance ownership dynamics: the insured under the student scheme 
in 2004 
  Baseline model    Extended model 
Variables  Another 
scheme  Uninsured    Another 
scheme  Uninsured 
Individual characteristics           
Age  0.78  0.76**     0.85  0.80*   
Age squared  1.02***  1.02***    1.01**  1.01*** 
Male  0.95  1.00       0.96  1.02    
Kinh  0.36**  1.34       0.30**  1.08    
Primary education
(a)  0.50*  0.61*      0.52*  0.64    
Lower secondary
(a)  0.25**  0.34**     0.23**  0.27*** 
Upper secondary
(a)  0.32*  0.14***    0.51  0.23**  
University and higher
(a)  0.60  0.00***    0.24  0.00*** 
Ill  0.82  0.56**     0.77  0.54**  
Chronic  0.42  0.59       0.42  0.54    
Disable  1.97  0.86       1.79  0.82    
Smoking  2.70*  3.17***    2.62*  3.06*   
Household characteristics           
HH size  0.91  1.02       0.91  1.01    
Proportion of children age under 7  3.17  0.54       1.86  0.37    
Proportion of children aged 7 to 17  1.55  1.26       0.93  0.91    
Proportion of elderly  0.82  0.73       1.00  0.89    
Proportion of people ill  0.97  0.92       1.05  0.95    
Near poor
(b)  0.28***  0.46*      0.28***  0.44*   
Average
(b)  0.22***  0.51       0.21***  0.48*   
Better-off
(b)  0.07***  0.28***    0.06***  0.26*** 
Rich
(b)  0.16***  0.30***    0.13***  0.25*** 
Semi-permanent house
(c)  0.82  0.72*      0.86  0.79    
Permanent house
(c)  0.41*  0.74       0.53  1.07    
Commune characteristics           
Urban  0.97  0.66**     1.06  0.68**  
Commune 135  4.10***  1.29       4.81***  1.55    
“Change” variables           
At school  0.51  0.32**        
Enrolling school
(d)                       0.00***  0.01*** 
Leaving school
(d)                       0.10*  0.09*   
Remaining at school
(d)        0.01***  0.01*** 
Income increase        0.93  0.97    
No of observations  2404      2404                  
Log pseudo likelihood  -1668      -1487                  
Pseudo R-Square  0.15      0.25   
Note:   - Remaining insured under student scheme is set as the base group; Regional variables are included. Training, 
married, head and wage sector variables are dropped because there is not much variation in these variables 
- 
(a): No education; 
(b): Poor; 
(c): Temporary house; 
(d): never at school are set as the base group, respectively. 
- Population means weighted to reflect sampling weights; - Relative Risk Ratio is reported. 
- ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Source: own-calculation from the VHLSS 04 and 06.   41 
    Table 8 Health insurance ownership dynamics: the insured under the non-student voluntary 
scheme in 2004 
  Baseline model    Extended model 
Variables  Another 
scheme  Uninsured    Another 
scheme  Uninsured 
Individual characteristics           
Age  0.95  0.85       0.95  0.84    
Age squared  1.00  1.00       1.00  1.00    
Male  1.24  0.70       1.49  0.59    
Married  0.06  0.10       0.08  0.12    
Kinh  0.00***  0.00***    0.00***  0.00*** 
Primary education
(a)  2.31  2.99       2.11  3.08    
Lower secondary
(a)  0.55  1.65       0.48  1.36    
Upper secondary
(a)  0.43  2.26       0.41  1.64    
University and higher
(a)  2.88  0.89       2.71  0.68    
Training  7.27*  1.10       7.17*  1.36    
Ill  1.48  2.66       1.44  2.18    
Chronic  2.94  1.08       2.75  1.09    
Disable  2.38  1.39       2.56  1.58    
Smoking  1.55  5.05       1.40  5.77    
Household characteristics           
HH head  0.86  0.50       0.79  0.51    
HH size  0.99  0.68       0.96  0.72    
Proportion of children age under 7  0.95  70.37       1.17  13.47    
Proportion of children aged 7 to 17  0.41  38.65       0.50  33.94    
Proportion of elderly  0.13  0.12       0.13  0.14    
Proportion of people ill  1.47  0.78       1.49  0.98    
Near poor
(b)  0.19  0.57       0.18  0.47    
Average
(b)  0.45  4.81       0.50  3.10    
Better-off
(b)  0.78  1.02       0.78  0.60    
Rich
(b)  1.16  4.75       1.28  2.24    
Semi-permanent house
(c)  0.07***  0.63       0.07***  0.45    
Permanent house
(c)  0.07**  0.60       0.07**  0.59    
Commune characteristics           
Urban  0.27*  0.71       0.27*  0.93    
“Change” variables           
At school  11.09*  0.24       9.68  0.31    
Private wage  0.50  0.07*      0.43  0.10*   
Public wage  27.55**  2.77       22.78**  2.91    
Income increase        1.09  0.86    
No of observations  229      229                  
Log pseudo likelihood  -142      -140   
Pseudo R-Square  0.36      0.37   
Note:   - Remaining insured under non-student voluntary is set as the base group; Regional variables are included. Commune 135, 
change in sector of employment and schooling status variables are dropped because there is not much variation in these 
variables 
- 
(a): No education; 
(b): Poor; 
(c): Temporary house are set as the base group, respectively. 
- Population means weighted to reflect sampling weights; - Relative Risk Ratio is reported. 
- ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Source: own-calculation from the VHLSS 04 and 06.   42 
Appendix Table 1 Variable definitions 
Variable name  Variable definitions 
Age  Current age (in years) 
Age squared  Age squared (in years squared) 
Male  Dummy = 1 if male, = 0 if female (the base group) 
Married  Dummy = 1 if married, widowed, divorced or separated; =0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Kinh  Ethnicity Dummy = 1 if Kinh or Chinese; = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Education  Achieved levels of education: no education (the base group), primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, university or higher 
Training  Dummy = 1 if obtained long-term vocational training or professional high school, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Ill  Dummy = 1 if have any illness in the last 12 months; = 0 if have no illness (the base group) 
Chronic  Dummy = 1 if has any chronic disease, e.g. diabetes, hepatitis, = 0 if have no chronic disease (the base group) 
Disable  Dummy = 1 if have any difficulty in one of the seven functional ability; = 0 if have no difficulty (the base group) 
Smoking  Dummy = 1 if have ever smoked; = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Private wage  Dummy = 1 if working for wage in the private sector; = 0 if not working for wage in this sector (the base group) 
Public wage  Dummy = 1 if working for wage in the public sector (including SOEs); = 0 if not working for wage in this sector (the base group) 
At school  Dummy = 1 if currently at school or on vacation, = 0 if currently not at school (the base group) 
Household head  Dummy = 1 if is the head of the household, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Household size  Number of household members 
Proportion of members at 
various age cohorts 
Proportion of children age under 7, between 7 and 17, and 60 and over in the household 
Proportion of people ill  Proportion of people ill in the household 
Income group  Five household expenditure quintiles: poor (the base group), near poor, average, better-off and rich 
Semi-permanent house  Dummy = 1 if is the dwelling is classified as semi-permanent, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Permanent house  Dummy = 1 if is the dwelling is classified as permanent, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Region  Eight residential regions: Northeast (the base group), Red River Delta, Northwest, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, 
Central Highlands, Southeast and Mekong River Delta 
Urban  Dummy = 1 if residential area is urban, = 0 if rural (the base group) 
Commune 135  Dummy = 1 if the commune is the beneficiary of the 135 Program, = 0 if otherwise (the base group) 
Change in schooling status  Not at school in 2004 and 2006  (as the base group), Not at school in 2004 but at in 2006, At school in 2004 but not in 2006, At 
school in both 2004 and 2006 
Change in public wage earner 
status  
Non wage-earner in the public sector in both 2004 and 2006 (the base group), Non wage-earner 2004 and wage-earner 2006, 
Wage-earner 2004 and non wage-earner 2006, Wage-earner  in the public sector in both 2004 and 2006 
Change in private wage 
earner status 
Non wage-earner in the private sector in both 2004 and 2006 (the base group), Non wage-earner 2004 and wage-earner 2006, 
Wage-earner 2004 and non wage-earner 2006, Wage-earner  in the private sector in both 2004 and 2006 
Income increase  Change in real per capital expenditure between 2004 – 06    43 






2006   
Uninsured 
2004 and 










                   
Age    37.514    31.276    25.577    28.362  32.548
Age squared    1703.861    1413.984    984.439    1211.567  1439.534
Male    0.484    0.458    0.519    0.525  0.495
Married    0.719    0.512    0.339    0.424  0.558
Kinh    0.940    0.821    0.911    0.786  0.867
Primary education    0.314    0.276    0.311    0.260  0.290
Lower secondary    0.297    0.210    0.257    0.210  0.250
Upper secondary    0.103    0.118    0.136    0.128  0.116
University and higher    0.006    0.015    0.004    0.070  0.028
Training    0.021    0.028    0.024    0.076  0.040
Ill    0.304    0.288    0.227    0.283  0.289
Chronic    0.090    0.108    0.053    0.087  0.089
Disable    0.166    0.168    0.121    0.162  0.162
Smoking    0.320    0.206    0.184    0.198  0.250
Wage work – private sector    0.033    0.032    0.034    0.026  0.031
Wage work – public sector    0.011    0.028    0.046    0.148  0.060
At school    0.104    0.222    0.537    0.489  0.302
Household head    0.327    0.242    0.145    0.225  0.265
Household size    4.800    4.925    5.005    4.932  4.880
Proportion of children age under 7 in the household    0.075    0.090    0.061    0.073  0.076
Proportion of children aged 7 to 17 in the household    0.241    0.268    0.306    0.295  0.268
Proportion of elderly (age>=60) in the household    0.104    0.107    0.080    0.091  0.099
Proportion of people ill in the household    0.303    0.284    0.242    0.271  0.285
Near poor    0.236    0.229    0.212    0.170  0.212
Average    0.241    0.195    0.231    0.152  0.203
Better-off    0.224    0.178    0.216    0.207  0.209
Rich    0.164    0.158    0.155    0.230  0.183
Semi-permanent house    0.617    0.583    0.608    0.559  0.592
Permanent house    0.205    0.172    0.182    0.225  0.204
Red River Delta    0.239    0.192    0.236    0.195  0.216
Northwest    0.009    0.036    0.020    0.054  0.029
North central coast    0.119    0.141    0.111    0.168  0.138
South central coast    0.080    0.093    0.071    0.111  0.092
Central highlands    0.042    0.064    0.060    0.076  0.058
Southeast    0.157    0.140    0.187    0.123  0.145
Mekong River Delta    0.271    0.178    0.197    0.136  0.205
Urban    0.217    0.222    0.238    0.295  0.244
Commune 135    0.063    0.179    0.106    0.208  0.134
Not at school in 2004 but at in 2006    0.009    0.048    0.019    0.023  0.022
At school in 2004 but not in 2006    0.031    0.037    0.225    0.058  0.055
At school in both 2004 and 2006    0.072    0.297    0.312    0.431  0.246
Non wage-earner 2004 and wage-earner 2006 (public)    0.006    0.031    0.013    0.015  0.014
Wage-earner 2004 and non wage-earner 2006 (public)    0.007    0.008    0.031    0.020  0.013
Wage-earner 2004 and wage-earner 2006 (public)    0.004    0.020    0.015    0.128  0.048
Non wage-earner 2004 and wage-earner 2006 (private sector)    0.022    0.036    0.048    0.017  0.025
Wage-earner 2004 and non wage-earner 2006 (private sector)    0.021    0.013    0.017    0.008  0.015
Wage-earner 2004 and wage-earner 2006 (private sector)    0.013    0.019    0.017    0.019  0.016
Change in real per capital expenditure between 2004 - 06    1.342    1.297    1.267    1.648  1.426
Number of observations    6161    2968    1136    5239  15504
 Note:   - Sample of 15504 individuals in the panel 
- Population means weighted to reflect sampling weights.  
Source: own-calculation from the VHLSS 04 and 06.   44 
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